workplaces exhibit three facts which, taken together, could con- 
The causes of these negative workplace attitudes are reasonably well known. One cause is job layoffs. Waves of downsizings and restructurings have made employees at almost all levels feel less secure (Osterman, 2006) . Few employees are going to be willing to work harder voluntarily or provide ideas to enhance productivity if the consequence is that they or their coworkers will lose their jobs (for example, Locke, 1995) . Cascio (2002) has extensively reviewed the evidence on the negative effects of layoffs and work intensification on outcomes ranging from physical and mental health to product quality to job attitudes.
A second cause of employee disengagement and diminished productivity is the pervasive and growing conflict between work and family. There are now more women college graduates than men, and more women in senior corporate ranks than 20 years ago (Cappelli, 2006) . But work-family programs and policies have not kept pace with changing workplace demographics. Even where there are workfamily policies, informal norms often exist against using these policies because "putting family first" is frequently taken as a negative signal of employee loyalty and commitment ( Fourth, job satisfaction is low and declining because the actual workplace is-even in the absence of some of the physical punishment and abuse of the past (for example, Jacoby, 2004, chap. 1)-still a place frequently characterized by verbal bullying and psychological harassment. For example, one study of 800 employees in the United States reported that 10 percent said they witnessed incivility daily within their workplaces, and 20 percent said that they personally were targets of incivility in the workplace at least once a week (Pearson and Porath, 2005). A study of more than 600 nurses found that one-third had experienced verbal abuse within the preceding five days (Graydon, Kasta, and Kahn, 1994). It is possible that, objectively, the typical workplace today is actually better than it was in the past. However, even if the data simply reflect rising expectations on the part of employees, it is nonetheless the case that these same studies show that perceptions of workplace bullying lead to consequences forjob attitudes and turnover intentions. For example, because it is widely believed that the poor treatment of nurses has led to a nursing shortage as people voluntarily leave the occupation, the KaiserPermanente medical group in Colorado has adopted a "zero tolerance" policy for verbal abuse of nurses and has reported better nurse retention and attraction following its implementation.
Many observers see changes in the conditions of work, including reduced pensions and medical benefits and more layoffs, as an inevitable consequence of increasing competition and globalization with accompanying pressures for efficiency and productivity. But there is evidence of substantial variation in human resource management practices across companies within the same industry, with some companies choosing to use a "high road," commitment-based strategy including higher wages and employment security, while other, seemingly similar companies pursue a "low road" approach (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994). More importantly, there is little evidence that firms that use a "low road" approach end up being more competitive or productive. For instance, Costco pays higher wages and offers a higher proportion of its workforce benefits, including health insurance, than does Sam's Club, a division of Wal-Mart. analyses to produce the annual Fortune list of the best places to work). The site has a number of charts that show stock market returns of the companies on the list compared to various benchmarks after the companies had been listed, assuming a "buy-and-hold" strategy and also assuming that each year a new portfolio was constructed when a new list came out. In each instance, the public companies on the list (a significant fraction are privately held) outperformed the various benchmarks.
Although the various studies of the effects of human resource practices use somewhat different variables, a consensus has emerged about the elements of a high-commitment or high-performance set of management practices. "Highcommitment" work arrangements include investment in training to develop skills and knowledge; a regime of mutual commitment and employment security with long-term expectations for the employment relationship; rewards contingent on individual but also group and organizational performance; decision-making structures such as decentralization and self-managed teams that permit trained and motivated employees to actually influence decisions about work; and the sharing of information so that people can understand the business and have the data to make better inferences about what to do and how to do it (Pfeffer, 1998; Shaw, 2006 ).
An Organizational Behavior Perspective
An organizational behavior perspective helps explain why these various practices affect the productivity and discretionary effort of employees and also how to understand and predict the effects of various human resource management policies. There are many relevant components of an organizational behavior perspective-here we highlight three: First, people are social creatures and as such, are concerned with their relationships with others and influenced by what others say and do. As a result, perceptions, preferences, and attitudes are at least partly endogenous , and people derive an important part of their social identity through their affiliations. Second, people are concerned about fairness and justice, both distributive outcomes and also the processes through which those outcomes get determined. Because of this interest in both processes and outcomes being equitable, people will, as economists increasingly have recognized (Fehr and Gachter, 2000) , actually expend resources to "punish" individuals who violate norms of fairness. And third, organizations as institutions in their own right are also embedded in a social context and are influenced by and imitate other organizations, in part to achieve legitimacy by acting like or looking like others and in part to conform to social expectations and norms (Scott, 1995) .
There are a number of direct implications of these assumptions for understanding both the design and implementation of human resource policies and practices and their effects. In the rest of this section, I consider how the various high-performance work practices are logically consistent with the ideas from an organizational behavior perspective.
Rewards for Organizational and Group, Not Just Individual, Performance
The ideas of fairness and equity imply that individuals expect to benefit when their efforts improve the economic performance of their employers. One of the current sources of dissatisfaction, as evidenced in union-management negotiations in the airline and automobile industries as well as in general public discourse, is that when employees have given up wages and benefits, in some instances company financial results have improved, but senior management and shareholders, rather than employees, have enjoyed virtually all of the benefits of the improved economic performance. At the same time, differentially rewarding individuals creates distinctions among people, thereby increasing social distance, and can, as typically administered, produce perceptions of unfair treatment. Thus, it is likely that rewarding group or organizational performance through schemes such as profit-or gain-sharing or through some form of equity ownership will create fewer problems than rewarding individuals. Collective rewards transfer some portion of the economic gains to employees, consistent with the idea of fairness, while doing so in ways that are less disruptive to valued social relations among employees.
Although some economists have noted that collective rewards run into the freeriding problem (Williamson, 1985 , chap. 10), the evidence from numerous surveys, even by the compensation consulting firms that often administer performance-based pay systems, typically show widespread dissatisfaction with individual pay for performance both on the part of those subjected to it and those administering the plans (Hewitt, 2004) . Consistent with the idea that social relations are important and that people will choose to do things to maintain them, experimental research (Leventhal, Michaels, and Sanford, 1972) shows that people choose to allocate rewards more equally than would be expected on the basis of differences in performance and particularly make more equal distributions of rewards when those distributions are going to be public.
In work organizations, differentiated individual rewards can create feelings of inequity. That's because few organizations face conditions similar to those of Safelite Glass (Lazear, 2000) , where work was independent, performance could be inexpensively and objectively assessed, and performance metrics were essentially unidimensional-how many windshields got installed. Employees often see differentiated rewards as the result of arbitrary management favoritism, in part because most people see themselves as being "above average." The evidence supports employees' suspicions about performance ratings. One study found that individual performance ratings were more highly correlated with whether the person being rated had been hired by the person doing the rating-who is going to be more committed to the person whom he or she has chosen-than with the individual's objective performance (Schoorman, 1988) . Consistent with this argument about individual differentiation in rewards being perceived as unfair and disruptive of social relationships, field evidence suggests that pay dispersion has generally negative effects. Data from a survey of college and university faculty suggests that the greater the level of salary dispersion in academic departments, the lower the level of job satisfaction, the less likely faculty were to work collaboratively on research with others from the same department, and the lower the level of research productivity (Pfeffer and Langton, 1993) . In top management teams whose technology involved interdependence, greater dispersion in rewards-either vertically or horizontally-was associated with lower levels of organizational performance, as measured by total shareholder return and the ratio of market to book value for two years following the pay data (Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). Larger differences in pay between senior management and the workforce are associated with lower quality (Cowherd and Levine, 1992). Even in baseball, a setting where individual performance is relatively "independent," Bloom (1999) studying 29 teams and 1,500 players over an eight-year period found that teams with more dispersed salaries had lower win-loss records and gate receipts, while players on teams with more dispersed salaries performed more poorly, controlling for measures of their ability (as assessed by prior performance). More dispersed salary distributions have also been found to be associated with more turnover among academic administrators (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1992), with those people lower in the salary distribution particularly likely to leave.
Employment Security and Layoffs
The employment relation today is more market-like than it was in the past, as Cappelli (1999) and many others have recognized. Not only are layoffs more frequent, layoffs occur not just in response to dire economic straits but as part of "restructuring" to further increase stock price and profits. From an organizational behavior perspective, layoffs create several problems, which is why it is scarcely surprising that comprehensive reviews of the evidence find that layoffs frequently don't increase stock price, productivity, profitability, innovation, quality, or other measures of company performance (Cascio, 2002).
Layoffs disrupt social relations in the workplace. Evidence suggests that many "survivors" experience feelings of guilt and depression and reduced satisfaction and commitment to the job and the organization; are more likely to leave; and have lower levels of job performance (Brockner, Grover, Reed, DeWitt, and O'Malley, 1987; Brockner, Konovsky, Cooper-Schneider, Folger, Martin, and Bies, 1994). Consistent with the importance of equity and fairness perceptions, when people feel those laid off were not adequately compensated, these negative effects are larger. In fact, some evidence suggests that perceptions that procedures and outcomes were fair can virtually eliminate the negative psychological reactions to downsizings of both survivors and those laid off, although relatively few companies seem to have embraced the implications of these findings in their behavior. Absent real participation in corporate governance, employees believe they are being asked to "pay" for the decisions and mistakes of others. Moreover, given the retention bonuses offered to senior executives, even under conditions of bankruptcy, and the availability of golden parachutes and the fact that at least in some of the airlines, senior management used company assets to secure their own pension obligations while they were canceling the pensions of pilots and flight attendants, many employees don't see restructuring outcomes as being particularly fair.
Second, the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) is one of the most fundamental rules governing human behavior, having been found in every human culture studied and even among baboons. In the absence of companies making long-term commitments to their work force, that work force is not likely to take a long-term view of its attachment to their firms or feel much loyalty to them. And contrary to some discussion that current employees actually aren't interested in employment stability or long-term bonds with their employers, survey evidence suggests the opposite-that there are people, albeit not everyone, who actually would prefer working in systems of mutual commitment and would prefer building 
Why Organizations Don't Do What They Should
Many economists have asserted that high-commitment management practices have actually been reasonably widely adopted (Osterman, 1994; Shaw, 2006). Although such practices are undoubtedly better known and more widely used than they were several decades ago, the extent to which organizations have fully adopted and adequately implemented systems of high-performance management arrangements is small relative to the apparent benefits from doing so. Shaw (2006, p. 230) noted that by 1990 approximately half of all firms had some innovations in human resource management, but the proportion of firms that had implemented the full complement of high-commitment work arrangements was much lower. If a higher proportion of firms had implemented high-commitment work arrangements, the various survey data on employee engagement, trust in management, and turnover intentions would not be as bad as it is.
Are High-Commitment Work Practices Too Costly?
The most common economic argument as to why there has been relatively little adoption of high-commitment work practices, at least compared to the potential gains, is that implementation of such systems of human resource management is costly. The costs identified include acquiring new skills on the part of both managers and workers and the need to implement high performance management practices as part of a system that exhibits complementarities (Shaw, 2006). For instance, investing in training probably won't deliver much benefit if the now-trained workers don't also get to use that training through enhanced decisionmaking responsibility and control over work processes.
The cost argument has two problems: First, many studies of the differences in performance between plants or companies that have implemented highperformance work arrangements and those that have not find economically substantial benefits of a size likely to outweigh any plausible estimate of costs. MacDuffie (1995), for instance, reported both productivity and quality differences of greater than 40 percent between automobile plants that had implemented flexible or lean manufacturing and those that had not. A study of steel minimills (Arthur, 1994) found that mills using a commitment-oriented management approach required 34 percent fewer labor hours to produce a ton of steel and had a 63 percent better scrap rate. Second, some of the most egregious management behaviors that causejob dissatisfaction, distrust, and disengagement should be almost costless to stop. For example, ending verbal abuse in the workplace and lying to employees need not be particularly expensive. Thus, the cost argument is largely unpersuasive and, at its limit, can become tautological because some sort of cost can always be adduced after the fact to explain the nonadoption of a particular management practice. Moreover, the idea that good management practices aren't invariably implemented is not new in the economics literature. For instance, in a review of the literature on employee participation in decision making, Levine and Tyson (1990) first noted that participation was associated with higher performance and then adduced a number of environmental factors that might cause this innovation in workplace management to be implemented less frequently than might be expected given its positive consequences. For instance employment security is more difficult and more costly to implement when there are more, deeper, and longer recessions.
Participatory firms are also disadvantaged by high unemployment, wide wage dispersion, and the absence of universal "just cause" dismissal policies. There is no reason to believe that Levine and Tyson's analysis of the importance of external conditions would apply less strongly to other elements of high-commitment management approaches, nor that their analysis exhausts all the reasons why productivity-enhancing management innovations might not be adopted.
There are a number of theoretical perspectives from organization theory that can help us understand mechanisms and processes that can result in the persistence of arrangements that don't make much economic sense. I mention a few of them here.
Why Organizations Might Not Adopt Human Resource Management Innovations
Companies (and individuals) tend to copy what others do, sometimes in an almost mindless fashion. In organization studies, the basic idea of companies copying what others do is predicted by institutional theory (Scott, 1995) . Institutional theory argues that certain ways of doing things become taken for granted and companies, to achieve social legitimacy and to conform to social expectations for appropriate behavior, adopt these institutionalized practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The importance of social relations also predicts conformity behavior, since similarity is an important basis of attraction. Therefore, companies, or people, find it easier to build ties with others the more similar they are to the targets of their relationship building.
The evidence shows that behaviors ranging from adopting poison pill antitakeover defenses (Davis, 1991) These pressures for institutional conformity can override considerations of what might be more efficient. For example, a study of downsizing found that imitation of other companies' behavior explained the likelihood of a company laying people off better than economic measures such as profitability (Budros, 1997). The evidence on imitation implies that the diffusion or absence of the diffusion of management practices, including human resource practices, is to some extent independent of the value or worth of those practices.
Another process that affects the choices companies make, independent of considerations of efficiency or performance, is power. Organizational decisions are influenced by other powerful organizations, an idea at the core both of resource dependence and institutional (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) theories. In the current landscape, at least in the United States, organizations that either provide access to or represent the interests of the capital markets and investors are among the most powerful organizations (Fligstein, 2001 ).
For reasons that are well outside the scope of this article, many investment analysts and others in the financial community do not appear particularly sympathetic to firms that adopt high-commitment work arrangements, possibly because these companies may be viewed as putting employees ahead of shareholders. When SAS Institute, the largest privately owned software company in the world, was considering going public, the head of human resources and the chief executive officer both told me that the company felt that its very generous employee benefits were at risk because the investment community considered such expenditures to be a waste of money, even though SAS Institute's low turnover (typically less than 5 What is sometimes less well recognized is that some evidence suggests that unionization is positively associated with the adoption and persistence as well as the effective implementation of high-performance human resource management practices. For instance, Drago (1988) , studying the survival of quality circles, found that unionization was positively related to this practice persisting. Another study of 325 manufacturing plants examining union effects on quality improvement and participation found that establishments with programs jointly administered by management and unions achieved much greater improvement than establishments with programs that were controlled just by management (Cooke, 1992).
The human resources department, which has traditionally been an advocate of employee well-being, has also lost power. Many human resource functions are being outsourced, with a corresponding loss in the size of the department and also the budget it controls. In the political dynamics that shape policies ranging from the adoption of internal labor market arrangements (Pfeffer and Cohen, 1984) A fourth perspective on how suboptimal human resource policies can be chosen and persist proceeds from the almost unarguable assumption that companies and their leaders decide what to do about managing people based on their implicit and explicit assumptions about people and organizations. As an example, Tetlock (2000) found that practicing managers' responses to scenarios involving various decision dilemmas could be predicted by their different assumptions about human nature, which, in turn, shaped their different philosophies of corporate management and governance. Those assumptions were, in large measure consistent with economics language and assumptions-that is, the managers assumed that people are self interested (Miller, 1999) , may engage in self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 1975) , and are effort averse (Lazear, 1999 ) so that they require incentives and monitoring to ensure performance. These assumptions are largely inconsistent with the implementation of high-commitment policies based on mutual trust. Specifically, companies are less likely to share information with people who are presumed to be self-interested and to pursue their interests occasionally using some amount of deceit; are unlikely to allocate substantial decision rights and participation to individuals who are presumed to be mostly self-interested and consequently unconcerned about organizational well-being; and are less likely to invest in the training and development of people who are presumed to be effort averse and focused only on their own interests and so may leave at the prospect of a better job offer.
The obvious response is that if these assumptions are, in fact, incorrect and the resulting human resource practices inefficient, companies will learn this fact over time and adjust their decisions accordingly. But many theories of behavior are self-fulfilling, in that in acting as if they were true and setting up organizational arrangements accordingly, the norms, presumptions, and organizational arrangements create precisely the behaviors consistent with the theoretical suppositions that they imply. As Frank ( another, the Community Game. Mutual cooperation was the rule and defection the exception when the game was labeled as "Community," while the opposite was true when the game was labeled "Wall Street." These four mechanisms-social influence and contagion, groups that don't think about or value human assets holding substantial power in the company, measurement systems, and language and assumptions about human behaviorall help account for why high-commitment management practices may not be implemented regardless of their efficiency properties. And they represent just a partial set of the theories from organizational behavior that might account for why companies persist in not doing things that would enhance their performance.
Conclusion
Several conclusions can be drawn from this overview of organization theory perspectives on human resource management. First, just as economics has, at least to some extent, come to accept the findings of the literature on individual cognitive bias and its implications for human judgment and decision making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), it would be useful for economics to explore the extent to which more macro-level theories of organizational bias and irrationality can enrich our understanding of company behavior, including behavior with respect to the implementation of various human resource practices. Such a perspective would almost seem to be required to account for the facts that 1) employee attitudes and related behaviors are generally poor, 2) employees and how they are managed are important sources of company success and competitive advantage, 3) and methods for achieving a culture of high-performance are known, but apparently not implemented. Although one could dismiss the results of any single survey or study as possibly flawed or not representative, the overwhelming preponderance of evidence makes such a position virtually untenable.
Second, organization theory offers some views of both human motivation and organizations as social institutions that can provide not only assumptions from which to build theory but also perspectives to test empirically. Being open to both examining and accepting various alternative conceptions of individuals and organizations might be as productive in the domain of understanding human resource management as it has been for enriching our conceptualization and understanding of human judgment and choice.
Finally, one of the lessons of organizational behavior and the social psychological idea of the self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1948 ) is that theories matter (Frank, 1988) , in that what we believe about human behavior helps to create expectations, norms, and institutional arrangements that make those beliefs come true. This process is certainly true in the domain of human resource management.
If companies rely primarily on financial incentives, people will become conditioned to expect such incentives for desired behavior and will come to see incentives as more important. If companies treat employees as if they can not be trusted, those employees will come to see themselves as untrustworthy and behave accordingly. This is true, if only for the reason that when cheating is expected, there will be more instances of entrapment (Lingle, Brock, and Cialdini, 1977) .
Because theories apparently matter and because there are more perspectives on human behavior than are currently accommodated in traditional personnel economics, it would seem that there are many opportunities for building more complex and multifaceted perspectives on human resource management. In addition, because theories do matter, it is important for both public policy and company performance to undertake this task.
